"Selfl ess and kind … are there such people in the West? At the time, Poland decided to off er NTSNP a lot of help without making any conditions. We owe it undying gratitude. Our co-operation with the Poles before the war provided a basis for co-operation during the war".
1 It was in these rather high-sounding words, forty years aft er the war, that Arkady Stolypin, a member of the leadership of the National Workers' Union of the New Generation, 2 a son of Pyotr Stolypin, a famous Russian politician, the author of reforms designed to transform Russia into a liberal empire, thanked the Poles. What did Stolypin really thank for aft er so many years? Th is part of his speech became an inspiration for me to research the history of co-operation of Polish authorities with the circles of the Russian emigration in the years [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] , in the context of the Promethean work performed with regard to other peoples of the former empire. Th is article is an abbreviated presentation of the issues and the fi rst results of this research.
The beginnings of co-operation
Th e fi rst steps towards an agreement with the Russians were taken at the behest of Józef Piłsudski by Karol Wędziagolski, who had been sent to Paris to get in touch with Boris Savinkov and Nikolai Tchaikovsky. 3 Wędziagolski was chosen because he enjoyed the confi dence of both the Chief of State and Savinkov. 4 Th e course of the Polish-Russian negotiations, and the emergence of the idea of "the third Russia" was described in a comprehensive manner by Andrzej Nowak in his monograph Poland and the three Russias. I should advise the reader that one of his conclusions was that an agreement with "the third Russia" could have led to the seizure of Moscow by Savinkov only in very favourable conditions, including the capture and holding of Kiev by the Ukrainians, which did not happen aft er all. 5 Basing his political and military action on Poland, Savinkov had to accept the right of peoples to self-determination. 6 We are unable to determine whether he was actually going to observe this right. One can also have serious doubts whether he would be able to force the Russian society into respecting it. 7 Th e agreement with Piłsudski also required co-operation with the allies of Poland, i.e. the representative of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), ataman Symon Petlura 8 and with General Stanislav Bulak-Balakhovich, deliberately manoeuvring at that time between the Belarusian and Russian identity. 9 Savinkov was the only Russian émigré leader who was willing to co-operate with all anti-Bolshevik forces in order to liberate Russia. Th at willingness to co-operate and the demarcation of new borders through holding population plebiscites made Savinkov, in the optics of the Russian public, a controversial person. However, it should be recalled that his co-workers, well-known Saint Petersburg intellectuals, forming the so-called literary triumvirate, i.e. Dmitry Merezhkovsky, Zinaida Gippius and Dmitry Filosofov, were even more radical in their views; they believed that Poland should return to the pre-partition borders of 1772.
Th e stake that Piłsudski probably played for was only the lands of eastern Belarus and, to a lesser extent, Kiev, but capturing it and holding it depended then only on the Ukrainians, and their forces were insuffi cient.
14 It was a shocking message for the Russians. 15 Apart from the independent units of Balakhovich, Yakovlev and Salnikov (incidentally, these units were not ethnically uniform Russian troops), the 3rd Army did not take part in combat since it was not yet suffi ciently organized and equipped. Th e truce meant that the combined Russian-Cossack-BelarusianUkrainian forces would have to continue their combat without the support of the Polish Armed Forces, which minimized the chance of success. Balakhovich and Savinkov's solitary off ensive in Belarus, and Piermykin and Petlura's towards the Crimea, quickly collapsed. By early December, all the troops that had managed to cross the Polish border, where they were sent to internment camps, returned.
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Th ese events took place a little later than the evacuation of General Wrangel's troops from the Crimea to the Balkans. Th us, the last serious attempt to incite counter-revolution collapsed.
Th e RPC's reputation began to fall rapidly, which manifested itself even if in the change of its name to the Russian Evacuation Committee (REC). Seeking a way out of the situation, Savinkov was forced to make more and more concessions to other nations. It is evidenced by the draft of an agreement to create a Union of States on the territory of the former Russian Empire, the recognition de jure of Estonia, Latvia, Georgia (interestingly, the draft makes no mention of Lithuania, whose fate was not yet settled due to the functioning of Central Lithuania) 17 and the agreement with the UPR, under which its independence and the government 14 I agree with the opinion of Andrzej Nowak and Joanna Gierowska-Kałłaur that in Piłsudski's concept Balakhovich and Savinkov's joint action was primarily aimed to recapture the lands of eastern Belarus from the hands of the Bolsheviks, which Savinkov was not quite aware of; Nowak, Polska i trzy Rosje, pp. 606-607; J. Gierowska-Kałłaur, "Straż Kresowa wobec kwestii białorusk-iej. Deklaracje i praktyka", Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 44 (2009) , p. 32. On the Polish side, in October 1920, no wide-range action, such as e.g. the issue of a march on Moscow raised in journalism, could be taken into account. Piłsudski, as well as Savinkov, and even Wrangel, mainly due to Lloyd George's policy (France was, in fact, forced to seek rapprochement with London, and could not pursue a fully independent Eastern policy), lost the chance to obtain the military support of the West, which sought agreement with the new Bolshevik power; A. Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 -zapomniany appeasement, Kraków, 2015 Savinkov's close associates, Gippius and Merezhkovsky, until 1919 -1920 , Toruń, 1999 IISH, BVSP, the Draft of the agreement between the Government of the UPR and the RPC on the "Union of States" to be established on the territory of the former Russian Empire, 23 February 1921, doc. 137-138. headed by Petlura were recognized. Th is draft agreement was signed on 17 March 1921 by the representatives of both parties, on the eve of the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet peace treaty in Riga; it sustained the arrangements of the convention concluded between the RPC and the UPR of 18 November 1920. 18 In addition, in early January, a secret meeting of the REC was held, where it was decided to re-launch the People's Union for the Defence of Homeland and Freedom, create an information offi ce at it, and to convene in July 1921 a congress of anti-Bolshevik organizations, to which, importantly, the non-Russian peoples of the empire were invited.
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Th e opening of a new chapter of the Polish-Russian co-operation was hampered by the provisions of the Treaty of Riga, where both parties undertook not to provide shelter or support political movements aff ecting the independence or constitution of either party.
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Contrary to the clauses of the Treaty of Riga, representatives of anti-Bolshevik movements did not leave Poland. On the contrary, the headquarters of the REC at 68, Marszałkowska st. in Warsaw hosted a convention of anti-Bolshevik organizations on 13-16 July 1921. According to Russian researchers, 140 activists turned up, including as many as fi ft y from Bolshevik Russia.
21 Among them were also representatives of Ukrainian organizations, the head of the Ukrainian Military Mission, General Viktor Zelinski, Belarusian, Cossack, and probably Georgian organizations, and others. Th e convention was also attended by Poles, including Marshal Piłsudski's envoy, Colonel Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, the order offi cer at the Chief of Staff , General Stanisław Dowoyno-Sołłohub, 22 and representatives of several embassies: British (Secret Intelligence Service agent, Sidney Reyly, and Lieutenant Colonel Emilius Clayton, a member of the military mission), French, Belgian, Italian and American.
23 Th e participants in the convention stressed the need for co-operation among the nations of the former empire with the aim to create "the third Russia" -one respecting the rights of other nations and historic states. Th ey also decided to engage in co-operation only with the states of the Entente, excluding one with the Germans, who -in the opinion of the delegates -were natural enemies of Russia.
24 Th e activity of anti-Bolshevik organizations was possible thanks to the acquiescence of Marshal Piłsudski, who was taking into account the possibility of resumption of war in the spring of 1921, and the use of these forces, 25 which, however, collided with the policy of the government of the Republic of Poland that wanted to observe their treaty obligations, and pressed for the liquidation of armed White Guard troops operating near the border with Bolshevik Russia, and for the expulsion of their leaders.
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Th e convention mentioned above provoked a lively response on the part of the Bolsheviks, who all the more energetically began to demand the expulsion of the "White Guards". Th e pressures of the Polish government caused that, at the end of October, Savinkov with some of his associates had to move to Prague (leaving Poland, he did not hide his grudge towards the Poles).
27 Dmitry Filosofov, who, aft er all, soon returned to Poland (in the years 1921-1924, he served as director of the Polish branch of the People's Union for the Defence of Homeland and Freedom), did not avoid a forced departure. In subsequent years, eff orts were made to expel only those persons who were hostile to Poland, while giving formal satisfaction to the Soviet Union, which insisted, following the assassination of polpred (plenipotentiary representative) Pyotr Woykov and an attempt on the life of Alexei Lizarev, that the Polish state remove anticommunist activists from its borders.
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Despite the expulsion of the main leaders of anti-Bolshevik organizations, the Second Department of the General Staff , dominated by Piłsudski's subordinates, did not lose touch with the Russians. A special advocate of co-operation with Savinkov's organization was the chief of the Second Department, Lieutenant Colonel Ignacy Matuszewski, who, in November 1920, wrote: "Having infl uence on the energetic, fair Russian group provides us with an opportunity for equally 25 T. Snyder, Tajna wojna. Henryk Józewski i polsko-sowiecka rozgrywka o Ukrainę, Kraków, 2008, pp. 38-39;  According to Paweł Libera, following the signing of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932, the Promethean movement was even in a crisis, which lasted until its reform in 1935. 41 Aft er the liquidation of Savinkov's organization in the fi rst half of the 1920s, apart from his close associate Filosofov and a handful of his followers there was no Russian centre of anti-imperial nature opting for even limited co-operation with the Promethean nations, and accepting the Polish eastern border.
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Moreover, at the turn of 1926 and 1927, the inspirational scandal of Soviet intelligence code-named "Trust" was uncovered. According to one version, advocated by three offi cers of the Second Department, the uncovering of the mystifi cation was to take place following Piłsudski's personal intervention, who became interested in the matter already in July 1926. He instructed the organization "Trust", through Major Janusz Iliński, deputy Polish military attaché in Paris, to obtain the Soviet plans of guard and concentration, upon the reception of which he ultimately ordered to break off co-operation. 43 Due to the spectacular fi asco of 38 M. Kornat, "Idea prometejska a polska polityka zagraniczna (1921-1939/1940) MOCR-Trust" 1922 -1927 , Warszawa, 2010 . Th e views of researchers on Piłsudski's role in the uncovering of the inspirational operation are divided (the list of literature concerning the operation Trust has several hundred items -studies, monographs and articles -and it is because of the inability to refer to all of them that we are going to focus only on the most recent works of Polish historians). Both Konrad Paduszek and Marek Świerczek claim that the memories of the "Seconds" [members of the Second Department which was also called "Dwójka", i.e. "two" in Polish] were supposed to serve the mythologisation of the person of the Marshal, while Andrzej Pepłoński and Wojciech Włodarkiewicz follow the version presented by the former offi cers of the "Second", highlighting the Marshal's the Second Department, inspired from 1921 by the Soviets, its the then chief, Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Schaetzel, was responsible for the termination of co-operation with "Trust". According to one thesis, he had an argument with the Marshal on "Trust"; it is believed that it could have been the reason for his leaving the position of the chief of the Second Department and being transferred in February 1929 to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs.
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Despite the signifi cant diff erences in the views on the shape of future Russia between the Russian emigration and the Promethean nations, and the embarrassment of the former as a result of the "Trust" scandal, the Polish authorities maintained both directions of co-operation. However, they became more distrustful of the Russians and began to look for other sources of intelligence, shift ing the burden of co-operation to the "Promethean" nations and the open-source intelligence conducted by military attachés (no co-operation with any organization operating in the USSR was risked any more).
Th e attitude of the Promethean movement to the Russian emigration in the policy of the Polish state could be compared to the aorta and a thin vein, which if cut, could result in the bleeding of the whole organism to death. By this I mean the need for co-operation, and even if it was only to bring meagre results, it would allow to retain some control over both streams, weakening the pro-German and pro-Soviet currents. Year by year, both of them gained more and more infl uence among the Promethean nations and Russian émigrés, a noteworthy example of personal participation in the uncovering of the Soviet operation; Paduszek, Polski wywiad, p. 332; M. Świerczek, "Udział Wiktora Tomira Drymmera w aferze MOCR-Trust w świetle jego artykułu z 1965 r. pod tytułem Trust. Wstęp do analizy", Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 10 (2014), pp. 165-166; A. Pepłoński, Wywiad polski na ZSRR 1921 -1939 , Warszawa, 1996 1921 -1939 , Warszawa, 2002 . In my opinion, any possible order to cease co-operation in December 1926 could not be executed immediately, since the termination of such a complicated operation required some time. In April 1927, the Soviets decided to reveal the operation (for the purposes of further misinformation), probably realizing that Polish intelligence no longer trusted "Trust", R. Wraga, "O szpiegach prowokatorach i naiwnych emigrantach", Wiadomości, 806 (1961) . Th is thesis is supported by the fact that already on 27 May 1927 a proposal of a similar operation directed against the USSR was put forward in Agency no. 2. Th erefore, it is impossible that the Second Department began to withdraw from the co-operation with "Trust" only in April 1927; cf. the content of the proposal: W. Stanisławski, Myśl polityczna emigracji rosyjskiej w II Rzeczpospolitej: interpretacje przeszłości i koncepcje polityczne, a typescript of the doctoral dissertation in the Library of the Historical Institute of Warsaw University, p. 263, fn. 173. Unfortunately, due to the lack of access to the full documentation, and even a monograph that would compile all of the available source material and the extensive literature on the subject, it is impossible to formulate a defi nitive answer to the question of Piłsudski's role in the uncovering of the operation "Trust"; however, because of the weight he attached to this type of activities, it cannot be ruled out that it was signifi cant. It seems, however, that the uncovering of the operation took place before April 1927. 44 M. Kornat, "Tadeusz Schaetzel (1891 -1971 , nota biografi czna", Pressje, 10, [22] [23] p. 98. which was the movement of Russian fascists developing in Germany and the Far East, and Alexander Kazem-Bek's Mladorossi. 45 Th at vein was primarily Filosofov's group, who also attracted the supporters of the Novopokolentsy until the outbreak of the world war operating mainly with the support of the authorities of Yugoslavia, and with the approval of the services of Poland and Japan 46 (there were also other anti-communist Russian groups, whose activity was tolerated until the early 1930s despite their anti-Polish attitude). Filosofov had a unique position in the Russian circles because of his familiarity with the Chief-of-State. In the years 1920-1926, as he recalled, they had about fi ft een talks at the audiences in Belweder Palace and meetings in Sulejówek; 47 among all Russian immigrants, he was one of the few, and perhaps the only one, whom the Marshal trusted.
48 Aft er Piłsudski's death, in response to Filosofov's letter of condolence, Tadeusz Schaetzel wrote: "Of those of non-Polish nationality, you are in the fi rst rank of those who are standing at his coffi n and can feel close to him". 49 In the eyes of emigrants, Piłsudski was generally regarded as being anti-Russian, 50 Military and civilian state institutions in co-operation with the Russians Th e main burden of co-operation with the Russians lay with the Second Department of the General Staff , including the offi cers of Division "East", which I will discuss further below. Th e Russians were also under the surveillance of employees of the "Ethnic" Division of Agency no. 2 of the Second Department of the General Staff . Its main task was to implement Promethean work among the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.
55 Th e department conducted preparatory and sabotage work, to this end supporting various organizations founded by emigrants from the USSR (except the Russian ones).
56 Th e surveillance of offi cers holding diplomatic posts pointed to the need to maintain extreme caution with regard to the Russians, who could be useful only in counter-intelligence work.
57 Eff orts were also made to discourage Japanese intelligence from this co-operation, as evidenced by a fragment of encrypted correspondence from the post "Cholski" of January 1935 -"Admittedly, the inside of the 'Cherry Blossom' [Japanese intelligence] is infested with the parasite 'White moth' [white emigration], therefore, an action should be taken by the 'metowcy' [offi cers of the Second Department remaining in the Far East] with the aim to make the Island aware of the dangers of the White moth's participation itself". 58 An equally important issue, in addition to the penetration of "white" organizations by Soviet intelligence, was their views on the future of 53 E. Wiszka, Emigracja ukraińska w Polsce 1920 -1939 , Toruń, 2004 Ibid., 209 Russia, which was to remain undivided, with autonomies for some nations as a last resort. Th is required the constant monitoring of emigrants trying to fi ght the Prometheans: "Both Russian politicians in exile and the Soviet ones attempt to paralyse the action of separatists".
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A considerable part of the Promethean action was also conducted by civilian institutions, including the personnel of ministries who oft en had the experience of work in the Second Department. Th ere is evidence that some of them were also interested in co-operation with selected Russian circles such as Filosofov's circle, that of the Novopokolentsy, and even more broadly Eurasianists. Such co-operation was attempted with Sergey Voytsiekhovsky, sympathising with the Eurasian movement, the author of the article "Polska a Eurazja" [Poland and Eurasia] , published in the second issue of Droga of 1928, by off ering him, at the beginning of 1928, a meeting with professors Marian Zdziechowski and Jan Kucharzewski at the Eastern Institute. Also, the Russians living in Poland were interested in co-operation with the Polish authorities themselves, as evidenced by the fi gure of a young activist of the "Vilnius Eurasian Group", Andrei Surkov, who sought to reinterpret the Eurasian doctrine so that it could be acceptable to the other peoples of Russia. . Also the main press organs of the "white" emigration were subject to control, ibid., pp. 208-215 (on-line collection); ibid., scan 714, p. 4 (on-line collection). Th e Bolsheviks also inspired monarchist press, fuelling anti-Polish feelings: "In April this year, sensational news of the alleged agreement between the Polish Government and representatives of the Caucasian, Tatar, Ukrainian and Cossack independence organizations concerning the future territorial division of Russia appeared in the Russian monarchists' daily published in Belgrade under the title Tsarsky Vestnik (no. 89 of April 27 this year). On the basis of only the very entanglement of names of individual representatives we can infer that the news was also probably inspired by the Bolsheviks, all the more that it was immediately quoted in Soviet newspapers", ibid. поддержку со стороны правительственных кругов, как материальную, так и политическую". 65 As a correspondent of Segodnya, Kyelnich could prove to be a valuable collaborator, all the more that in addition to the establishment of the Committee, Filosofov also planned to "refresh" Za Svabodu! (Hołówko promised fi nancial support). 66 According to Kyelnich, it was an attempt to escape the political isolation in which he had got stuck, criticized or ignored by the majority of emigrants. Sergey Voytsiekhovsky, a correspondent for the newspapers Vozrozhdeniye and Segodnya, as well as a former resident of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), was an intermediary in the handing over of Filosofov's off er. Kyelnich did not agree to co-operate either in 1928 or in 1930; 67 in both cases, the funding was provided by Hołówko. 68 Recruiting him would probably change the tone of the information he handed over to Mikhail Milrud's Riga daily for more favourable for Poland (over time, it might be transformed into closer co-operation). In order to strengthen his infl uence on the press market, in 1931 Filosofov attempted to urge the well-known Vilnius minority activist Boris Pimonov, the owner of Nashe Vremya (published with the supplement Segodnya) to combine his newspaper with Za Svabodu! 69 According to Kyelnich, Filosofov aff ected the content of the material published in the Vilnius journal through its editor -"Оказывается, Марков там строго выполняет инструкции Фил<ософо>ва и ведет к обеденению с За Свободу!". 70 However, Kyelnich himself obtained this information from Georgy Shulgin, who, until 1931, was his confi dant in the editorial team of Za Svabodu! 71 Filosofov failed to establish co-operation either with Kyelnich, or with Pimonov. Th e reason was the diff erences of opinions and the reluctance of both of them to become politically subordinated to Filosofov. In addition to political factors, fi nancial issues and matters of prestigious nature played a considerable role. It turned out that the fact of co-operation of both Filosofov and Pimonov with the Polish state did not guarantee understanding between them.
It is possible that, through Voytsiekhovsky, Filosofov also tried to seek rapprochement with the creators of the widely-read Paris daily Vozrozhdeniye. Perhaps, he also held conversations on this topic with the "right" liberal, professor Pyotr Struve, who, in 1931, was also the editor of the Eurasian magazine Rossiya i Slavyanstvo. Th anks to his support, Filosofov could count on the strengthening of the pro-Polish orientation among emigrants. 72 Struve's visit to Poland did not contribute to the revival of the press co-operation (except for a brief period at the turn of 1934 and 1935, when Struve wrote to Miecz [Sword]); 73 it is for other reasons, however, that it is worth devoting more space here.
Th e professor fi rst came to Poland on 22 June 1926, offi cially for the International Congress of Science, and unoffi cially -as suggested by Richard Pipes -in connection with the initiation by Piłsudski, in May of the same year, investigation into the "Trust" case. 74 We know that, during the congress, they held a brief conversation which could not be of much importance due to the presence of third parties. 75 Following his return to France, Struve published an article in which he welcomed the May coup, 76 becoming part of his concept which assumed the good functioning of only old democracies; in other countries, "he tended to favour «strong men» exemplifi ed by Marshal Piłsudski, who provided fi rm political leadership without depriving the citizenry of its basic civil rights, especially the right to own property". 77 Struve's second visit took place at the turn of June and July of 1931. Offi cially, it was held in response to the invitation of the Russian Social Committee 78 (allegedly, the initiator of Struve's invitation, who was then in the Balkans, was a member of the RSC, and also the correspondent of Vozrozhdeniye, and a sympathizer of the Eurasian movement, Sergey Voytsiekhovsky). 79 Russian activists sent the invitation, probably following prior arrangements regarding this idea with Polish authorities, which agreeing to the arrival of one of the better-known, respected, Russian emigration professors, associated with the Eurasian movement, had the opportunity to make a gesture of good will towards the Russian community in Poland and Eurasian activists in the world, and to attempt to establish co-operation with the prominent Russian activist, known for his critical attitude to both Nazism and communism. 80 Struve appeared in Poland at the All-Poland Congress of Russian Minority Organizations, and took part in an open meeting of a discussion group (Лите ра-турное содружество), chaired by Filosofov. Th is group sympathized with members of the Novopokolentsy, and their communication platform was a supplement to Za Svabodu! -V svoyem uglu. According to Viktor Baidalakov, 81 similar supplements were also published as part of the magazines Rossiya i Slavyanstvo, ed. P. Struve (Paris, 1928 (Paris, -1934 , and Russkiy Golos, ed. V. Pronin (Belgrade, 1931 (Belgrade, -1941 , popular with the members of the Novopokolentsy 82 -it would be extremely interesting to examine the narratives of these two titles with regard to Poland, and the extent of interest in them by "Dwójka" ("Th e Second Department"). Th e professor also gave a series of hugely popular talks in Warsaw, Vilnius and Grodno on the inability to realize the Soviet fi ve-year plan, and the Polish-Russian relations. His addresses could greatly assist in the campaign of winning round the Russians by the ruling camp; he said, among others, "that the idea of Polish independence has always been a necessary link in the system of political philosophy across the leading pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia, however, he added at the end: "I have not been appointed to speak on behalf of the whole Russian emigration about RussianPolish relations, but I must say that the national Russia which will come aft er the fall of the communist regime, will not have aggressive goals, but it will only deal with its internal aff airs […]". 83 In his honour, Prof. Aleksander Lednicki held a breakfast party, which was attended by numerous scholars and the head of the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, Tadeusz Schaetzel. During Struve's stay, and following his departure from Poland, several articles maintained in a tone favourable for Poland were published in Vozrozhdeniye and Za Svabodu!
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As we already mentioned above, since 1928 Hołówko sought to set up a prostate, infl uential, illustrated Russian newspaper. 85 Such an opportunity occurred 81 At the age of 18, V. Baidalakov (1900 Baidalakov ( -1967 took part in the civil war on the side of the "whites", he evacuated to Yugoslavia together with Wrangel's armies, where he graduated in chemistry from the University of Belgrade, was an organizer of the National Alliance of the Russian Youth Abroad (NSRM), since 1931 the chairman of the National Alliance of the New Generation (NSNP), subsequently transformed into the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS). 82 At the same time it should be emphasized that, despite the opinion of his Russian political opponents, Filosofov collaborated with the Poles for ideological, and not fi nancial reasons, as typical agents. Despite the fi nancial dependence upon the Polish state, he maintained the independence of his views, did not always agree with the ethnic and religious policy implemented by Piłsudski's subordinates 91 and, in principle, actually lamented the lack of it -"Th ere are two «camps» in Poland. Some say: there are the Ukrainians, Belarusians, but there are no Russians. We are ready to do much for the Ukrainians and Belarusians. Yet, nothing is being done. Others say: there are only the Russians. But nothing is being done for them". 92 Filosofov was the most persistent knight of the "third" Russia -anti-imperial, anti-Bolshevik, democratic, respecting the rights of minorities, which is why in his work he focused on improving Polish-Russian relations, and fought all manifestations of chauvinism both among the Russians, and other nationalities. 93 Commenting upon the political situation, he tried to remain objective, calling for the mitigation of ethnic confl icts between the Poles, Ukrainians and Russians, which -in his opinion -could only benefi t the Bolsheviks.
It seems that for the Polish authorities the year 1931 was a turning point in terms of gaining infl uence among both the Russian minority and emigration, among which the RSC -established thanks to Filosofov -as a coalition organization gained a lot of support from the Russians.
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The NTS -its establishment and cooperation with Division "East" Th e alliance that turned into the NTS was formed from the merger of Russian youth organizations from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia into the NSRM (Национальный
Союз Русской Молодежи за Рубежом [Th e National Alliance of the Russian Youth Abroad]).
95 Th e First Congress of the Alliance was held in 1930, during which other youth organizations joined. Th e Second Congress, which was attended by representatives from seven countries, including Poland represented by Alexandr Würgler, took place the following year (the identifi cation sign of the delegates getting off the train onto the platform was the Eurasian newspaper Rossiya i Slavyanstvo). 96 It was one of the most important congresses. It adopted the new name of the organization (Национальный Союз Нового Поколения [the National Alliance of the New Generation]) and its programme; it also elected its authorities -Viktor Baidalakov was appointed the chairman of the board in Belgrade, and the chairman of the board based in Paris -Prince Sergey Nikolayevich Leykhtenbergskiy; it was also established that a member can only be a person born aft er 1895 97 -older members had to obtain permission of the Executive Bureau. It was in this way that they wanted to avoid disputes within the party, which the older politicized generation was so permeated with.
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It is diffi cult to determine when the fi rst contacts of Polish immigrants with the youth organizations in the Balkans took place; hypothetically, the Congress of Russian Writers in Belgrade in 1928, which was attended by representatives of the Union of Russian Writers and Journalists in Poland -with the chairman, Sergey Kyelnich, and Anatol Wielmin (although rather neither of them became a member of the NTS) provided an opportunity to do so.
99 Alexandr Würgler joined the union probably in the same year; he may have already been linked up with the New Generation movement at that time. He may have come with the task to recruit new sympathizers for them. Acting in the Union of Russian Writers and Journalists (Союз русских писателей и журналистов в Польше), he must have come into contact with Filosofov. Th e main elements that could enable the establishment of co-operation between them included anti-bolshevism, anti-totalitarianism, respect for other nationalities, federationalism, to some extent democracy, and activation of young people. Although we do not know when Division "East" came in contact with the New Generation movement, and whether Filosofov's meeting with Würgler was held under its patronage, or whether Filosofov put Würgler in touch with the Second Department, it is certain that it must have been done with the knowledge and consent of "Dwójka's" [the Second Department's] leadership.
a Swiss citizen), in 1923 he began studying at the Russian Institute of Economics, in 1928 he obtained the title of a Doctor of Economics, then he went to Poland and joined the Union of Russian Writers and Journalists; in 1931 he was a delegate to the Congress of the NSRM; in 1934 he participated in the Th ird Congress and became a member of the Executive Bureau; he was the head of the Polish branch of the NTS, and collaborated with Japanese intelligence through the Japanese attaché, General Savada, and the chief of Division "East" of the Second Department of the General Staff , Captain Jerzy Niezbrzycki; during the World War he undertook collaboration with a general at Sonderdivision "R", Boris Smyslovsky, an Abwehr offi cer; thanks to the co-operation with Sergey Voytsiekhovsky, the chairman of the Russian Committee in Warsaw, he carried out the illegal transfer members of the NTS to the German-occupied areas of Russia; it was probably one of the reasons (in addition to contacts with the Polish underground) for his assassination by a Gestapo agent in 1943 (the NKGB [People's Commissariat for State Security] also had their share in this murder); И.В. Грибков, Д.А. Жуков, И.И. Ковтун, Особый штаб " Россия", Москва, 2011, pp. 81, 84, 92, 100; Байдалаков, Да возвлечится Россия, p. 83 . 97 Вюрглер, На II oм съезде, p. 6. 98 Ibid. 99 AAN, MSW, Ref. no. 1932, fol. 41-46. As already mentioned, the New Generation were a youth movement, and it was young people that Filosofov backed in his work. One of the major problems of the Russian diaspora was the ageing of its members; young Russians were becoming less and less sensitive to the problems of emigration, or interested in the situation in the Soviet Union, and even underwent assimilation, which aff ected especially those Russians who entered into nationally (ethnically) mixed marriages, and were awarded the Polish citizenship. Th ese problems were the subject of Filosofov's concern and he counteracted them not through anti-Polish propaganda, as some far-right Russian circles in the Borderlands did, but by holding the Polish Great Emigration as a model for the Russian emigration 100 -"Сколько надо сознательности, мужества и сил, чтобы бороться с коммунизмом и с шовинизмом, и в этой борьбе не забывать о ежедневной работе в 'огороде'. Русской эмигр<антской> молодежи (и там, в России!) надо заражаться психологией Мицкевичей […]". 101 In order to activate young people, he provided them in November 1927 with some space on the pages of Za Svabodu!, publishing the supplement Yedinyenye which was to become a platform for the exchange of views of the Russian youth. 102 In January 1930, along with Za Svabodu! came another supplement for the youth -V svoyem uglu; and the composition of its editorial board included Vladimir Brandt, 103 Antoni Dąbrowski, 104 Vasily Klemientiev, and Nikolai Riazancev, 106 who eventually emerged as sympathizers of the NSRM. Written by its representative in Poland, Alexandr Würgler, the fi rst issue of the supplement appeared on 30 April 1931, extensively informing about the activities of the NSRM. 107 At the turn of 1931 and 1932, the 2 nd Congress of the NSRM was held in Belgrade. Th e Polish branch was represented by Würgler, who reported on its course in "V svoyem uglu", and informed on the foundation of a new union under the name of the National Alliance of the New Generation. 108 Writing about the tasks of the Alliance, he singled out as the major ones the need to create "Vielikaya Rossiya"; with a view to achieving this, he considered it necessary to spark off a national revolution and establish a dictatorship for the transitional period. He also called for the unifi cation of all anti-communist organizations, fi ghting against the theory of evolution of the Bolshevik system, preventing the deprivation of the Russians of their national identity with the help of social and cultural organizations, and the preparation of the revolutionary cadre. He fi nished the article with an announcement addressed to those interested in the movement in which he encouraged them to report to the editorial team of V svoyem uglu. Th e ideological foundations of the NSNP were published in the same issue, and included: 1. the establishment of a strong, central, trans-class and trans-party authority; 2. the enactment of civil liberties, equality before the law, the abolition of class and estate privileges; 3. "In internal policy, the maintenance of healthy national egoism […]", in foreign policy, striving for possibly close cultural and political co-operation with the Slavs; 4. "Th e recognition of the right to national self-determination for the nations forming Russia"; 5. the solution of the agrarian issue; 6. the introduction of economic freedom, restricted only in the interest of the state. 109 In characterizing the views of members of the New Generation movement, we should refer to the London lectures of Wiktor Sukiennicki, a legal theorist, sovietologist and expert on the subject of Russia, who described them as democrats, supporters of the federal system, but not the dismemberment of Russia. Mikhail Gieorgiyevski -about 150 members, 112 which placed the Polish branch in the third place in Europe. 113 According to Stanisławski, its members recruited not only emigrants, but also members of the minority ROM, Ukrainians, Cossacks and others, establishing on the territory of the Republic of Poland 14 branches, 114 including in Warsaw, Łódź, Vilnius, Lvov, Sosnowiec, Kalisz, Brest-on-the-Bug. 115 It is possible that the ROM, the infl uence of which was also extended over the Russian Students Union and the Orthodox seminaries in Warsaw and Krzemieniec, as well as the universities and secondary schools (including Wawelberg's School) in which the Russians studied, was a cover for the NSNP. 116 New members were recruited through the press, 117 meetings and lectures (in the Borderlands, it had to be done with the consent of state authorities, as the Russians not residing in the eastern provinces had to have special permission to move around their area -see the case of Vladimir Brandt 118 ), and in the same way the denationalization of the Russian youth was counteracted. In all the relationships of NTS activists, whom we were able to reach, the assessment of the activity of the Polish section was very good; also its perfect concealment and good co-operation with the Poles were emphasized.
119 Th e scale of the NSNP's/NTS's activity is surprising for three reasons, and deserves special attention. Firstly, tolerating the recruitment of non-Russians must have been at odds with the activity of Agency no. 2 of the Second Department of the General Staff ; secondly, territorial administration generally looked unfavourably at the initiatives undertaken jointly by the Russian minority and émigré community, because it delayed the assimilation of the Russians; thirdly, the activity of the NTS in the eastern provinces required special permits from province administrators (emigrants could not move around them freely) and the overcoming of their reluctance; also their tolerance for the activities of Russian organizations decreased year by year (such an attitude was presented especially by the administrator of the Polesie province, Waclaw Kostka-Biernacki and the administrator of the Volyn province, Henryk Józewski).
Aft er the closing of Za Svabodu!, activists of the New Generation movement published in Molva, whose publisher was Vladimir Brandt, and the editor-inchief, Nikolai Riazancev. In May 1934, Molva was replaced by the weekly Miecz (Sword), run by the editorial committee composed of Filosofov (the chairman), Leon Gomolicki (the secretary), Yevgeniya Weber-Khiryakova and Georgy Sokolov (members), and Antoni Dąbrowski (the publisher and editor-in-chief). It was Filosofov's international project, parallel to which the Parisian edition of Miecz (Sword), edited by Merezhkovsky, was issued. It contained contributions by famous Russian intellectuals, e.g. from Poland and France (Gippius and Merezhkovsky) , and Czechoslovakia (Alfred Bem). As a result of disagreements between Merezhkovsky and Filosofov, this co-operation was broken off in September 1934. 120 # In his last article, Filosofov announced the transfer of the weekly to the younger generation, with Brandt and Sokolov becoming the new editors. As a result of the failure of the idea of Меч (Sword) as a weekly unifying Russian writers across Europe, Filosofov turned to Polish intellectuals. In November 1934, the fi rst meeting of the discussion group "Domik v Kolomne", chaired by him as a "starshina", was held. ; their authors sought a third way, which would allow them to regain their homeland, they sought support from other countries. 125 Th ey were of the opinion that any aggression against the USSR, also
by the the Japanese, should obtain support from the emigration; their opinion was shared by the majority of the Russian émigrés in Warsaw, in contrast to the very few Warsaw supporters of Milukov's group, who considered such conduct as betrayal. 126 Th ey combated the Soviet-inspired Alexander Kazem-Bek's "Smienoviekhovs" and "Mladorossis" movements deriving from the Eurasian ideology, 127 the fascists from the Russian People's Liberation Movement (Российское Освободительное Национальное Движение), founded in Germany in April 1933, 128 and the leader of the Cossacks in the Far East, Ataman Grigory Semyonov. 129 In their articles, they did not comment on the policy of the Polish government, nor did they engage in the aff airs of the minorities, although their calls were directed to all the Russians, in particular to the youth. Th ey repeatedly manifested their loyalty to the Polish state, publishing a lot of information and numerous photos from state ceremonies and holidays, especially those feting Marshal Józef Piłsudski. 130 It should be noted that in their activity emigrants, perhaps not quite consciously, oft en imitated the ruling camps in the countries where they lived. It certainly happened that their actions were inspired by the hosts of a given country. Also in Poland we can see a certain fascination with Piłsudski's camp, which was refl ected in the idea of creating the "Order of the Poor Knights" (Орден Бедных Рыцарей) (repeatedly cited by Filosofov; he used this term with reference to the group of "V svoyem uglu"), 131 a concept of the transitional dictatorship by Würgler, or the article on the occasion of Piłsudski's name day -"Мы эмигранты с особой ясностью осознаем, какое значение имеет вождь".
132 Certainly, it is not known to what extent it was caused by the functioning of the Polish environment, and to what extent by the pan-European trend continuing especially among young people -"Diff ering just like their 'fathers' in oft en signifi cant details, the 'young' unanimously pined for a 'brilliant leader' who would be able to gather and organize all active forces, national 'living forces', and overthrow materialistic, godless, internationalist Bolshevism, as well as rebuild a powerful and magnifi cent edifi ce of the 'Russian' ('one hundred-nation' and 'one hundred-language', and not just 'Great Russian') Empire".
133
The road to war Looking beyond the chronological frame of the article, we should assert that the Polish-Russian relations in the second half of the 1930s are still waiting for a thorough examination. It is now known that this was a period of intensifi cation of co-operation between the NTS and the Second Department of the General Staff . Among the involved offi cers, an important role was probably played by the chief of Division "East", mentioned in many Russian memoirs, Captain Jerzy Niezbrzycki.
134 Th e longest description of a meeting with Niezbrzycki was included in Brzhestovskiy's account, where he wrote, among other things: "Раз к нам в класс пришёл началник школы -шеф 'реферат всхуд' и, кажется, инициатор сотрудничества с НТС, по фамилии, на сколко сейчас помню, Врага. Поздоровавшись с нами, сказал, как он рад, что традиционное русское сопротивление силе зла продолжается, что теперь представителей етого сопротивления он видит в НТС и в нас и что-то ещё в етом духе". 135 Th is is in confl ict with the fi ndings of Łukasz Ulatowski, who said that Niezbrzycki very reluctantly used "the intelligence services of only the white Russians. He totally rejected the idea of beginning deeper co-operation with the emigration. […] Th e contacts of Division "East" with emigrants, individuals, fl ickered only throughout the 1930s". 136 Th e author admits that a small number of "the whites" worked for ment involved in co-operation with the Poles, the most important fi gures on the Russian side were the head of the Polish branch of the NTS, Alexandr Würgler, member of the Executive Bureau of the NTS, Vladimir Brandt, chairman of the ROM, Nikolai Shumlin, and member of the NTS leadership, Georgy Okolovich, supervising the transfer of activists to the USSR. Th e issue of the school for NTS members, organized with the support of the Second Department, and the staff functioning at it, whose chief was Okolovich ("штаб похода НСНП"), is still unclear. 142 It is diffi cult to pinpoint where it could be located, and whether it served only to train NTS members (members of the organization from all over Europe were trained in it). So far, we have managed to reach only one more detailed report which describes the course of such training. Mikhail Brzhestovskiy came to Poland from Germany in the summer of 1939 at Viktor Baidalakov's request, in order to follow such a course; aft er its completion, he was to be transferred to the USSR. Th e course lasted two months (June-July), during which time the participants were taught, among others, appropriate behaviour, the topography of the border regions, the geography of Russia, its railway network, encryption of correspondence, photography, the structure of the party and state apparatus, opening locks, using hand guns, Soviet terminology and everyday life (the materials that Okolovich created aft er his return from his fi rst mission to the USSR in 1938 were used), 60-70-kilometre keep-fi t marches were also organized. 143 Apart from the offi cers of the Second Department, the courses were taught by Gieorgy Okolovich, Shura Kolkov, Kornet Alexandr Chuprunov and, as should be assumed, Vladimir Brandt. Polish intelligence also facilitated the transfer of NTS members to the USSR, and fabricated documents for them. 144 It is interesting that it was through Stolypin, who completed a mission to Poland in the summer of 1939, that the NTS headquarters tried to warn the Poles about the attack from the east: "When I explained the purpose of my trip (warning the Poles about the danger threatening them from the Soviet side), he [Würgler] told me earnestly that I would not achieve anything. Having faithful friends in the Polish General Staff (such as Colonel Wraga, the chief of the Russian division, whom I subsequently met), he was already trying to open their eyes". 145 Assuming that the Russians actually presented evidence of the aggressive intentions of the USSR with regard to Poland, it is doubtful that Niezbrzycki underestimated them. 146 It seems that the information was blocked or misinterpreted at a higher level. Finding out about the attitude of the deputy director of the Political and Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs and the head of the Eastern Department at the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, Tadeusz Kobylanski (according to Pawel Wieczorkiewicz, referring to Russian monographs, a Razviedupr agent since 1937) 147 to the NTS activity, could play an important role in explaining the issue. His critical assessment of the activities of this organization could indicate that it was him who "blocked" the information, and it would corroborate the thesis of his secretive relations with the Soviets.
Polish-Russian co-operation was to continue also in Romania, among others through Georgi Okolovich, Mikhail Olgski, Captain Bronislaw Eliaszewicz, 148 and Captain Jerzy Niezbrzycki, who was to accompany the evacuated members of the NTS on their way to Romania, and then also to meet Vladimir Baidalakov himself in Belgrade.
149 It is worth mentioning that according to one report, the NTS suff ered heavy casualties as a result of the September campaign; allegedly, it was already then that the agitation work among the Red Army soldiers began. 150 of them (except the aforementioned Filosofov), admitted only the possibility of establishing autonomy for non-Russian peoples; less oft en than others they questioned the Polish border, and aft er World War II, also that of the Baltic states.
From the Polish point of view, the Promethean activity did not have to exclude the support of the Russian anti-communist movement; but the fact is that most of the committed Prometheans rather limited themselves to the monitoring of activities of Russian organizations, rather than undertook co-operation with them. Ever since the "Trust" scandal, co-operation with the Russians was weakened and remodelled. Infi ltrating the Russian circles, the Second Department came in contact with the New Generation movement. Co-operation with this movement was intensifi ed in the second half of the 1930s, and this trend continued until the outbreak of World War II. It did not assume obtaining information of strategic nature (from the centres of power), but was intended to provide general information about the Soviet Union, which in the late 1920s was already very tightly isolated from the rest of the world (perhaps the aim was also to build the foundations of a sabotage and intelligence network in case of war with the USSR). In the internal arena, co-operation with the Russians was used to support people loyal to the government among them, as a result of which in the early 1930s the eff ect of consolidation of the Russian movement around the Polish state was achieved.
Th e person particularly actively co-operating with the Russian emigration on the grounds of internal policy was Tadeusz Hołówko, standing out, in this respect, from other Prometheans; Bronislaw Pieracki and especially Henryk SuchenekSuchocki were involved in the matters of the Russian minority. From among the circles of the Second Department such fi gures included Colonel Tadusz Schaetzel and Captain Jerzy Niezbrzycki, who, according to Włodzimierz Bączkowski, with time began to believe that the "fall of Moscow is possible only in case of resistance, «in the fi rst place, of the Russian nation as the most populous one. Th e Russian people must become an ally of both the Poles and Ukrainians»".
158 His collaboration with the New Generation movement may have contributed to the formulation of this view, which could also be indicated by Brzhestovskiy's account cited above.
Th eir negative attitude to both the Th ird Reich and the USSR, which allowed to fi nd a common denominator with the Polish state, may have played an important role in establishing contact with the New Generation movement.
Th e question of the main objective of co-operation with NTS members remains unanswered. Was it merely all about juxtaposing anti-Polish youth movements with a pro-Polish association, obtaining information and committing possible acts of sabotage, not only in western Russia, but also in the Far East, 159 or also about creating a permanent pro-Polish lobby and a group that could be used in case of war with the USSR?
Another issue which needs examination is the question of how the New Generation movement was inspired by the Second Department, and to what extent it was natural collaboration, undertaken on the basis of an independent decision of NSRM authorities. Th e acquisition of this movement allowed to create among part of the emigration youth a good image of Poland, and -through the development of the organization -contributed to the weakening of the infl uence of pro-Soviet and pro-German youth organizations with a negative attitude towards the Polish state, competing with the NTS, a movement which emerged victorious, and as the only one continually expanded its structures, continuing operations aft er 1945, until the collapse of the USSR.
It should be emphasized that, apart from the NTS, also other organizations associated with the Eurasian movement, such as "Impierskiy Soyuz" and wellknown Russian activists such as Professor Pyotr Struve or, in Poland, Sergey Voytsiekhovsky and Andrei Surkov, were sounded out.
Th e decision to engage in co-operation with the NTS proved to be the Second Department's great "investment", even if none of those in charge of the matter had such intentions. Th is is evidenced by the loyalty that NTS members demonstrated towards the Poles in September 1939, and also during the Second World War, as well as aft er it, as we fi nd out from many memories.
Th e co-operation established in the 1930s has paid off until present day as the NTS has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and developed its activities in the country. Th e organization may be given credit not only for their actions to promote the ideas of the Russian emigration, such as the fi lm "Admiral", but also for lectures on the crimes committed by the USSR, including the murder of Polish offi cers in Katyń. Aff airs (occasionally engaged at the same time in Promethean work and contacts with leading members of Russian emigrants in Poland and abroad) towards the Russian emigration. Th us, the article is to answer the questions of the signifi cance of this diaspora to the Polish authorities and of the mechanisms of enlisting their support for the Polish state. Th e author has reached following conclusions: from the Polish perspective, Promethean activities did not automatically exclude the support for the Russian anti-communist movement, although in fact in the case of a majority of Prometheans it was limited to monitoring of activities of Russian organisations rather than cooperating with them. Contrary to opinions of some researchers, the cooperation with the Russians was not broken aft er the MOCR-Trust was revealed at the turn of the 1927, but was re-modelled. Oft en, the purpose of maintaining contacts with the Russians was to replace the activists inconvenient to the authorities with those who were loyal to them; such a policy brought about in the early 1930s the eff ect of consolidation of the Russian movement around the Polish state, and minimised German and Soviet impact on it. Th e study is based on the analysis of the Russian press, memories, published documents and correspondence, as well as materials hold in the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw, Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance and the online collection of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in New York and International Institute of Social History at Amsterdam.
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